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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
JAMES SWEET, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
GOOGLE INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No.  17-cv-03953-EMC    
 
 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Docket No. 29 
 
 
Plaintiffs are James Sweet, Chuck Mere, and Zombie Go Boom, LLC (collectively 
“Zombie”).  Mr. Sweet and Mr. Mere are the owners of Zombie Go Boom, which operates a 
channel – Zombiegoboom – on YouTube.  Zombie has been able to “monetize” the content it 
displays on its YouTube channel because Defendants Google, LLC and/or YouTube, LLC 
(collectively, “YouTube”) have a program under which content providers can get a cut of the 
revenue that YouTube makes from third-party advertisements.   Zombie has filed a class action 
lawsuit against YouTube, asserting that its revenues and the revenues of other content providers 
have significantly fallen after YouTube put restrictions on the placement of advertisements that 
did not meet YouTube guidelines.  Currently pending before the Court is YouTube‟s motion to 
dismiss.   
Having considered the parties‟ briefs and accompanying submissions, as well as the oral 
argument of counsel, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to dismiss. 
I.   FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In its first amended complaint (“FAC”), Zombie alleges as follows. 
“YouTube is [a] video-sharing website, which contracts with content providers to upload 
videos, to be viewed by members of the public worldwide.”  FAC ¶ 19.  YouTube has been able to 
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monetize the content on its website “by permitting third party advertisers, such as Wal-Mart, 
Verizon, General Motors and many others, to place advertisements at the beginning of videos.”  
FAC ¶ 22.  YouTube shares the advertising revenue it makes with content providers, which is an 
incentive for content providers “to focus on creating content as a full time job.”  FAC ¶ 23.   
Zombie is a content provider who, prior to the alleged misconduct by YouTube, was able 
to earn a living wage by working exclusively as a YouTube content provider.  See FAC ¶ 24 
(alleging that Zombie had over 1.6 million subscribers to its YouTube channel).  From 
approximately 2011, when the Zombiegoboom channel was founded, until the time of the alleged 
YouTube misconduct, Zombie made approximately $10,000 to $15,000 per month.  See FAC ¶¶ 
25-26.   
YouTube uses a program called AdSense to control placement of advertisements, 
depending on content provided and audience.
1
  See FAC ¶ 22.  In or about March 2017, YouTube 
changed the algorithm used in AdSense.  Apparently, YouTube took action because, in early 2017, 
it “was hit with a wave of bad press” after advertisements were placed on videos that contained 
hate speech and sexually explicit material, FAC ¶ 28, which, in turn, led to “approximately five 
percent of YouTube‟s advertisers [to] back[] out of agreements to place their advertisements on 
YouTube‟s content providers‟ videos.”  FAC ¶ 29.  YouTube changed the AdSense algorithm 
without notice (advance or otherwise) to the consent providers, without the consent of content 
providers, and without sharing with content providers what exact substantive changes were made 
to the algorithm.  See FAC ¶¶ 5-6, 33, 36-38.  (In spite of the above allegation, Zombie seems to 
admit that YouTube did release new guidelines regarding restrictions put on the placement of 
advertisements.  See FAC ¶ 5.)   
The change to the AdSense algorithm was “an attempt to automatically weed out 
inappropriate content, without the use of human oversight.”  FAC ¶ 30.  As it turns out, the 
algorithm was not effective: (1) It “under-inclusively failed to capture and demonetize content that 
                                                 
1
 AdSense has an algorithm that “automatically rates videos . . . in a similar way to movie ratings 
(G to R) or video game ratings such as E (for everybody) to M (for mature).  After the videos are 
automatically put into a category, advertisers can then [choose] to filter their advertisements to 
only be placed on certain categories of videos.”  FAC ¶ 33. 
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was sexually explicit, racist or otherwise not in compliance with the spirit of [YouTube‟s] 
guidelines,” and (2) it “over-inclusively demonetiz[ed] content that did not violate the spirit of the 
guidelines and was not objectionable to advertisers.”  FAC ¶ 7.  Zombie fell into the latter 
category.  See FAC ¶ 31.  Zombie claims that there are “thousands of [other] examples” although 
it identifies only one other example in its FAC.  FAC ¶ 40 (referring to a review for a “„review of 
a burger‟” which was deemed objectionable under the new AdSense algorithm).  Zombie and 
other content providers have dubbed the date that the algorithm was changed “Adpocalypse.”  See 
FAC ¶ 32. 
As a result of the algorithm change, Zombie‟s advertising revenue fell.  For example, after 
March 27, 2017, Zombie‟s advertising revenue fell from $300-$500 per day to $20-$40 per day.  
See FAC ¶ 32.   
Adpocalypse has also affected Zombie in other economic ways.  For example, prior to 
Adpocalypse, a third party offered Zombie $60,000 to purchase all of its existing online content; 
that offer, however, was rescinded after Adpocalypse.  See FAC ¶ 45.  Also, prior to Adpocalypse, 
Zombie was offered $25,000 to promote other products (outside the context of YouTube); after 
Adpocalypse, Zombie was able to contract for only $3,500 – and ultimately it received only 
$1,1500 because the response to the promotion did not garner the business anticipated.  See FAC ¶ 
46. 
Based on, inter alia, the above allegations, Zombie has asserted the following claims for 
relief: 
(1) Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200.  In its opposition brief, 
Zombie states that it is now proceeding with a theory of unfairness only, and not 
unlawfulness or fraud.  See Opp‟n at 23 n.19 (“Plaintiffs will agree to dismiss their 
claims under the fraudulent and unlawful prongs of the UCL.”).  As alleged in the 
FAC, YouTube has engaged in unfair conduct because it “devised and executed a 
material change to its advertising terms and AdSense practices, without providing any 
notice, either before[,] during[,] or after, in any conspicuous manner, to Plaintiffs or 
other providers,” and “[w]ith the intent and effect of stifling open and vigorous 
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competition in the market for content providers.”  FAC ¶ 68(a).  YouTube‟s conduct 
was also unfair in that it has “forc[ed] Plaintiffs and Class members to adhere to [its] 
undisclosed practices.”  FAC ¶ 68(d). 
(2) Tortious interference with contractual relations and/or prospective economic 
advantage.  According to Zombie, “YouTube was aware that Plaintiffs and Class 
members routinely enter into such related contracts with third parties, and that changes 
to [the] monetization structure, including demonetizing videos without notice or 
recourse, and altering the terms by which videos would receive compensation would 
have a direct impact on these contractual arrangements.”  FAC ¶ 95. 
(3) Breach of contract.  Zombie alleges that the parties had a contract under which it was 
“permitted to engage with YouTube as a content provider” and a contract that 
“governed [the] monetization structure for the posting of [its] content on YouTube.”  
FAC ¶ 101.  Zombie further alleges that YouTube breached the contract(s) by “altering 
the terms and conditions governing how Plaintiffs‟ and Class members‟ videos would 
be monetized.”  FAC ¶ 102. 
(4) Breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.  According to Zombie, YouTube‟s 
conduct has “unfairly prevented [Zombie] from receiving the benefits of the [above] 
contract[s].”  FAC ¶ 110. 
(5) Breach of quasi-contract.  Zombie alleges that YouTube “created a contract or quasi-
contract through which [it] received and continues to receive a benefit of monetary 
compensation without providing the consideration promised to Plaintiff and Class 
Members.”  FAC ¶ 117. 
YouTube now challenges Zombie‟s FAC in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.2  Although 
YouTube‟s motion is a 12(b)(6) motion, it has filed a declaration in support of the motion and 
attached to the declaration are several pieces of evidence.  The declaration is from a software 
                                                 
2
 YouTube previously moved to dismiss Zombie‟s original complaint but that motion was never 
heard as Zombie took the opportunity to amend its complaint instead.  YouTube argues that the 
amended pleading still has the same deficiencies as the original. 
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engineer at YouTube who testifies as follows: 
 Through the YouTube website, users can upload, share, and watch videos for free.  See 
Hawkins Decl. ¶ 2. 
 To upload videos, a user must first create a YouTube account.  During the process of 
creating an account, a user must assent to YouTube‟s Terms of Services Agreement 
(“TOS”).  See Hawkins Decl. ¶ 3. 
 The TOS incorporates YouTube‟s Community Guidelines, “which prohibit and caution 
users from uploading several categories of inappropriate video content.”  Hawkins 
Decl. ¶ 4. 
 A content provider has the option of participating “in a program that allows users to 
„monetize‟ their videos by allowing Google to display paid third-party advertisements 
in or alongside those videos.”  Hawkins Decl. ¶ 5.  To participate in this program, 
“users must manifest their asset to additional terms and conditions.  For most users, 
these are the standard „YouTube Partner Program Terms.‟”  Hawkins Decl. ¶ 5 
(emphasis added).  The YouTube Partner Program Terms expressly incorporate the 
TOS and „YouTube Partner Program Policies.‟”  Hawkins Decl. ¶ 6. 
 With respect to Zombie, it assented to the TOS on March 29, 2011 when it first created 
its YouTube account and YouTube channel.  See Hawkins Decl. ¶ 7.  In addition, it 
assented to the YouTube Partner Program Terms “that were operative during the time 
of the events alleged in the Complaint (March 2017)” on January 3, 2017.  Hawkins 
Decl. ¶ 8. 
Attached to the declaration are the TOS, the Community Guidelines, the Partner Program 
Terms, and the Partner Program Policies.  See Hawkins Decl., Exs. 1-4.  YouTube argues that the 
Court may consider this evidence, even on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, because Zombie 
expressly referred to the TOS and Partner Program Terms in its complaint.
3
  See, e.g., Swartz v. 
                                                 
3
 YouTube points, in particular, to ¶ 101 of the FAC which states as follows: “A contract existed 
between [Zombie] and Class members and [YouTube], which governed the terms and conditions 
by which [Zombie was] permitted to engage with YouTube as a content provider.  Similarly a 
contract existed between [Zombie] and Class members and [YouTube] which governed 
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KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that, “[i]n ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a 
court may generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the 
complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice” but, “in order to „[p]revent[] plaintiffs 
from surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by deliberately omitting . . . documents upon which their 
claims are based,‟ a court may consider a writing referenced in a complaint but not explicitly 
incorporated therein if the complaint relies on the document and its authenticity is unquestioned”) 
(emphasis added).  The Court agrees that it may take into consideration the exhibits attached to the 
Hawkins declaration, in particular because the TOS and Partner Program Terms are referenced and 
relied upon in Zombie‟s complaint, and the Community Guidelines and Partner Program Policies 
are incorporated by reference in the TOS and Partner Program Terms, respectively.  Zombie does 
not dispute that the documents may be taken into consideration – in fact, Zombie asks the Court to 
consider the documents itself.  
For purposes of the pending motion, the critical contract term is one contained in the 
Partner Program Terms.  That provision states as follows:  
 
Advertising Revenues.  YouTube will pay you 55% of net revenues 
recognized by YouTube from ads displayed or streamed by 
YouTube or an authorized third party on your Content watch pages 
or in or on the YouTube video player in conjunction with the 
streaming of your Content.  YouTube is not obligated to display 
any advertisements alongside your videos and may determine 
the type and format of ads available on the YouTube Service.  
For clarity, YouTube reserves the right to retain all other revenues 
derived from the YouTube service, including any revenues relating 
to ads on search page results. 
 
Hawkins Decl., Ex. 1 (YouTube Program Partner Terms at 1) (emphasis added). 
II.    DISCUSSION 
A. Legal Standard 
 
To survive a [12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
after the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007), [a plaintiff‟s] factual allegations [in the complaint] “must . . . 
suggest that the claim has at least a plausible chance of success.”  In 
                                                                                                                                                                
[Zombie‟s] monetization structure for the posting of [its] content on YouTube.”  FAC ¶ 101 
(alleging such in breach-of-contract claim). 
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other words, [the] complaint “must allege „factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 
is liable for the misconduct alleged.‟” 
 
. . . . [The Ninth Circuit has] settled on a two-step process for 
evaluating pleadings: 
 
First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, 
allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not 
simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but 
must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts 
to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 
defend itself effectively.  Second, the factual 
allegations that are taken as true must plausibly 
suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not 
unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to 
the expense of discovery and continued litigation. 
 
Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2014). 
Notably, 
 
[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” 
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 
acted unlawfully.  Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely 
consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line 
between possibility and plausibility „of entitlement to relief.‟” 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
B. Failure to State a Claim for Relief – All Claims 
In its motion to dismiss, YouTube makes a number of arguments but the primary one is 
that all of Zombie‟s claims for relief lack merit because the conduct of which Zombie complains – 
in essence, failure on the part of YouTube to post advertisements alongside Zombie‟s content – is 
expressly permitted by the parties‟ contract: 
 
[Zombie‟s] claims are precluded by the express terms of the parties‟ 
written contract.  That agreement – the YouTube Partner Program 
Terms – could hardly be clearer that YouTube has no obligation to 
display ads in connection with Plaintiffs‟ videos: “YouTube is not 
obligated to display any advertisements alongside your videos 
and may determine the type and format of ads available on the 
YouTube Service.” . . . . 
 
It is a bedrock principle of California law that no cause of action 
will lie where it is based on lawful conduct expressly permitted by a 
governing contract. 
Mot. at 5-6 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).   
While the above provision places no limit on YouTube‟s decisionmaking with regard to 
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advertisements, Zombie nonetheless argues that the “disclaimer” (“YouTube is not obligated to 
display any advertisements,” etc.) has implied limits, i.e., it must be applied in good faith or 
otherwise the term is unconscionable and/or the contract illusory. 
Zombie‟s unconscionability argument lacks merit.  Zombie admits that unconscionability 
requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability, although there is a sliding scale – i.e., 
“the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural 
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice 
versa.”  Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal. 4th 1237, 1244 (2016) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  With respect to procedural unconscionability, Zombie contends that this element is 
satisfied because the contract(s) between it and YouTube is one of adhesion.   
 
Whether the challenged provision is within a contract of adhesion 
pertains to the oppression aspect of procedural unconscionability [as 
opposed to the “surprise” aspect].  A contract of adhesion is 
imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength and 
relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to 
the contract or reject it.  [A]bsent unusual circumstances, use of a 
contract of adhesion establishes a minimal degree of procedural 
unconscionability notwithstanding the availability of market 
alternatives.” 
Walnut Producers of California v. Diamond Foods, Inc., 187 Cal. App. 4th 634, 646 (2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Arguably, the label of “adhesion contract” is not entirely fair 
in the instant case.  The instant case is not, e.g., a consumer or employment case where adhesive 
contracts are typically found.  Even if the contract(s) at issue were deemed adhesive, that simply 
establishes a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability such that Zombie would have to 
establish a fair amount of substantive unconscionability in order to prevail.  Cf. Darnaa, LLC v. 
Google, Inc., No. 15-cv-03221-RMW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161791, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 
2015) (in a case where plaintiff sued regarding the removal and relocation of its music video on 
YouTube, “find[ing] the level of procedural unconscionability to be slight, as plaintiff does not 
lack meaningful choice”; even though YouTube “„is undoubtedly a popular video-sharing 
website,‟” plaintiff “could have publicized the music video „by putting it on various other file-
sharing websites or on an independent website‟”).   
Zombie argues there is substantive unconscionability because cases have held that a term 
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that allows a party to unilaterally modify  a contract is unenforceable.
4
  See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing a term that gave employer right 
to modify or terminate any and all dispute resolution agreements with its employees unilaterally; 
finding such term substantively unconscionable).  But this case law is not on point because 
Zombie has pointed to no term within YouTube‟s TOS or Program Partner Terms that gives 
YouTube has such unilateral right to modify the contract.  The term at issue in the instant case – 
i.e., “YouTube is not obligated to display any advertisements alongside your videos,” etc. – has 
been in the contract from its inception and is not a unilateral modification provision.
5
   
Absent a viable theory of unconscionability, Zombie‟s argument against dismissal comes 
down to its contention that there must be limits on the above provision (“YouTube is not obligated 
to display any advertisements alongside your videos,” etc.) based on the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.  According to Zombie, absent application of such covenant, the contract is 
illusory and thus unenforceable.   
While the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be applied where contract 
terms are silent (see, e.g., Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating 
that “the implied covenant may only be used to supply a requirement of good cause for 
termination [of employment] when the contract between the parties is silent or ambiguous on that 
subject”), its application to contradict an express term of a contract is narrowly circumscribed.  In 
this regard, Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 41 Cal. App. 4th 798 (1995), is instructive.  The 
plaintiff in Third Story was a company that owned the rights to the musical output of 
                                                 
4
 Zombie primarily relies on federal case law because state case law is somewhat less forgiving.  
See Ridgeway v. Nabors Completion & Prod. Servs. Co., 139 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1091-92 (C.D. 
Cal. 2015) (comparing California case law holding that a term providing for unilateral contract 
modification is permissible so long as the party‟s power to modify is limited by fairness and 
reasonable notice with federal case law holding that unilateral modification provisions can be 
unconscionable). 
 
5
 YouTube‟s TOS does seem to have a unilateral modification provision but that provision is not 
at issue here.  See Hawkins Decl., Ex. 2 (TOS ¶ 1.B) (providing that, “[a]lthough we may attempt 
to notify you when major changes are made to these Terms of Service, you should periodically 
review the most up-to-date version [online and] YouTube may, in its sole discretion, modify or 
revise these Terms of Service and policies at any time, and you agree to be bound by such 
modifications or revisions”). 
Case 3:17-cv-03953-EMC   Document 36   Filed 03/07/18   Page 9 of 15
 10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
n
it
e
d
 S
ta
te
s
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
rt
 
F
o
r 
th
e
 N
o
rt
h
e
rn
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
o
f 
C
a
lif
o
rn
ia
 
singer/songwriter Tom Waits from 1972 to 1983.  The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the 
defendant under which (1) the plaintiff was to produce master recordings featuring performances 
of Mr. Waits and (2) the defendant had the right to, inter alia, manufacture, sell, distribute, and 
license the recordings but the defendant “„may at [its] election refrain from any or all of the 
foregoing.‟”  Id. at 801.  As consideration, the plaintiff was to receive, as a royalty, a percentage of 
the amount earned by the defendant from its exploitation of Mr. Waits‟s music.  In addition, the 
defendant was required to pay a specific dollar amount as an advance on royalties.  See id. 
The plaintiff and defendant‟s dispute arose when the plaintiff wanted to license some of 
Mr. Waits‟s recordings but the defendant refused because Mr. Waits did not personally approve 
the licensing request.  The plaintiff sued for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  In response, the defendant countered that “the clause in the agreement permitting it to „at 
[its] election refrain‟ from doing anything to profitably exploit the music is controlling and 
precludes application of any implied covenant.”  Id. at 802.  The plaintiff, in turn, argued that, 
where a contract gives a party discretionary power, that power must be exercised in good faith. 
The court posed the issue that is particularly apt here: “When an agreement expressly gives 
to one party absolute discretion over whether or not to perform, when should the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing be applied to limit its discretion?”  Id. (emphasis added).  In 
answering that question, the court looked first to a California Supreme Court case, Carma 
Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc., 2 Cal. 4t 342 (1992).  There, 
the parties entered into a lease agreement which provided, inter alia, that, if the tenant found a 
potential sublessee and asked the landlord for consent to sublease, the landlord had the right to 
terminate the lease, enter into negotiations with the prospective sublessee, and appropriate for 
itself all profits.  The Carma court noted that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
has particular application in situations where one party is invested with discretionary power 
affecting the rights of the other; such discretionary power must be exercised in good faith.  
However, the Carma court ultimately upheld the right of the landlord to terminate the lease in 
order to claim for itself all profit from the expected sublease.  The landlord‟s right arose from an 
express term in the parties‟ agreement, and, in general, an implied term should not be read to vary 
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an express term.   
The Third Story court recognized the tension in Carma and stated that it would try to 
reconcile the “apparent inconsistency between the principle that the covenant of good faith should 
be applied to restrict exercise of a discretionary power and the principle that an implied covenant 
must never vary the express terms of the parties‟ agreement.”  Third Story, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 
804.  The court noted first that it must take into account 
 
a long-established rule concerning implied covenants. To be 
imposed “„(1) the implication must arise from the language used or 
it must be indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties; (2) 
it must appear from the language used that it was so clearly within 
the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to 
express it; (3) implied covenants can only be justified on the 
grounds of legal necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only where 
it can be rightfully assumed that it would have been made if 
attention had been called to it; (5) there can be no implied covenant 
where the subject is completely covered by the contract.‟” 
 
Id. 
The Third Story court went on to discuss several cases “cited in Carma for the proposition 
that a discretionary power must be exercised in good faith.”  Id.  For example, 
 
[i]n Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 913, a bank 
was given discretion to set nonsufficient (NSF) charges to be paid 
by the customer.  The contention was made that since the charges 
were subject to the bank‟s sole discretion, the contract lacked 
mutuality and was, in fact, illusory.  (See Automatic Vending Co. v. 
Wisdom (196) 182 Cal. App. 2d 354, 356 [“„An agreement that 
provides that the price to be paid, or other performance to be 
rendered, shall be left to the will and discretion of one of the parties 
is not enforceable.‟”]  By its ruling that “„under California law, an 
open term in a contract must be filled in by the party having 
discretion within the standard of good faith and fair dealing,‟” the 
court in Perdue was able to impose an objective standard and save 
an otherwise illusory agreement. 
Third Story, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 804. 
The Third Story court went on to explain that, in Perdue and other similar cases,  
 
the courts were forced to resolve contradictory expressions of intent 
from the parties: the intent to give one party total discretion over its 
performance and the intent to have a mutually binding agreement.  
In that situation, imposing the duty of good faith creates a binding 
contract where, despite the clear intent of the parties, one would not 
otherwise exist.  Faced with that choice, courts prefer to imply a 
covenant at odds with the express language of the contract rather 
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than literally enforce a discretionary language clause and therefore 
render the agreement unenforceable. 
Id.  In short, the implied covenant was applied “to contradict an express contractual grant of 
discretion when necessary to protect an agreement which would otherwise be rendered illusory 
and unenforceable” – i.e., in order to effectuate the parties‟ intent to enter into a binding contract.  
Id. at 806 (emphasis added); see also id. at 804-06 (discussing case and noting that “[t]he tendency 
of the law is to avoid the finding that no contract arose due to an illusory promise when it appears 
that the parties intended a contract”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But, the Third Story court 
asked, “[d]oes a different result ensue where the contract is unambiguous, otherwise supported by 
adequate consideration, and the implied covenant is not needed to effectuate the parties‟ expressed 
desire for a binding agreement?  We believe it does . . . .”  Id. at 806. 
The Third Story court looked at cases cited in Carma where the implied covenant was not 
applied to limit an express contractual provision giving complete discretion to one party.  For 
example,  
 
[i]n Brandt v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., the employment 
contract at issue provided that when an employee‟s invention was 
deemed of sufficient value to apply for a patent and the patent 
application was granted, the employee would in all cases receive a 
total of $600.  In addition, the agreement said the employer “may, 
but is not obligated” to grant to any employee an additional “Special 
Invention Award.”  In response to two employees‟ claims that 
failure to make an adequate Special Invention Award in their case 
violated the covenant of good faith, the court held: “Few principles 
of our law are better settled, than that „[t]he language of contract is 
to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit. . . .‟  
[¶] Here the language of the parties‟ contract of employment, i.e., 
the patent plan, could not be more clear and explicit.  It says 
Lockheed‟s Invention Awards Committee „may, but is not obligated 
to grant a Special Invention Award,‟ and that its decision on such 
matters „shall be final and conclusive.‟  Lockheed had fully 
respected the patent plan‟s language; it may not reasonably be said 
that in doing so it violated a „duty of good faith and fair dealing.‟”  
(154 Cal. App. 3d at ¶. 1129-1130.) 
Third Story, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 807. 
The Third Story court emphasized that, in Brandt and the other like cases,  
 
one of the parties was expressly given a discretionary power but 
regardless of how such power was exercised, the agreement would 
have been supported by adequate consideration.  There was no 
tension between the parties‟ express agreement and their intention to 
be bound, and no necessity to impose an implied covenant to create 
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mutuality.  The conclusion to be drawn is that courts are not at 
liberty to imply a covenant directly at odds with a contract‟s express 
grant of discretionary power except in those relatively rare instances 
when reading the provision literally would, contrary to the parties‟ 
clear intention, result in an unenforceable, illusory agreement.  In all 
other situations where the contract is unambiguous, the express 
language is to govern, and “[n]o obligation can be implied . . . which 
would result in the obliteration of a right expressly given under a 
written contract.” 
 
Id. at 808 (emphasis added). 
Ultimately, the Third Story court found that the case before it was more like Brandt than 
Perdue.   
 
The illusory promise [i.e., that the defendant could at its election 
refrain from all marketing efforts] was not . . . the only consideration 
given by the [the defendant].  Under paragraph 33 of the 1977 
agreement and paragraph 34 of the 1972 agreement, [the defendant] 
promised to pay [the plaintiff] a guaranteed minimum amount no 
matter what efforts were undertaken.  It follows that, whether or not 
an implied covenant is read into the agreement, the agreement would 
be supported by consideration and would be binding. 
 
Id.  The court added that, while the guaranteed payments did not appear to be large, “unless the 
consideration given was so one-sided as to create an issue of unconscionability, the courts are not 
in a position to decide whether legal consideration agreed to by the parties is or is not fair.”  Id. at 
808 n.5. 
The question for the Court is whether the instant case is more like Perdue, where the 
implied covenant was found to apply and thus restricted defendant‟s discretion, or Brandt and 
Third Story, where the implied covenant was found not to contravene an express provision 
conferring complete discretion on the defendant.  The Court finds the latter applies.   
Regardless of how YouTube exercised its discretionary power in determining whether to 
display advertisements under the Partner Program Terms, the agreement (which consists of both 
the TOS and Partner Program Terms) between Zombie and YouTube was supported by adequate 
independent consideration.  In particular, YouTube allowed Zombie to post videos on its forum 
free of charge in exchange for getting a license to its content.  See Hawkins Decl., Ex. 1 (YouTube 
Partner Program Terms) (providing that, “[t]ogether with the YouTube Terms of Service [TOS] 
and the YouTube Partner Program policies . . . , the following YouTube Partner Program Terms 
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apply to your participation in the YouTube Partner Program”); Hawkins Decl., Ex. 2 (TOS ¶ 6.A-
C) (providing that, “[a]s a YouTube account holder you may submit Content to the Service” and 
that “you retain all of your ownership rights in your Content [but], by submitting Content to 
YouTube, you hereby grant YouTube a worldwide, nonexclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and 
transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute, [etc.] the Content in connection with the Service 
and YouTube‟s . . . business”).  The ability to post videos, even without advertising revenues, can 
be valuable to content providers in reaching a wide audience.  Moreover, the YouTube Partner 
Program encompassed more than just advertising revenues; content can be monetized in other 
ways such as subscription revenues.  See Hawkins Decl., Ex. 1 (YouTube Partner Program Terms) 
(providing that “YouTube will pay you 55% of the total net revenues recognized by YouTube 
from subscription fees that are attributable to the monthly views or watchtime of your Content as a 
percentage of the monthly views or watchtime of all or a subset of participating content in the 
relevant subscription offering (as determined by YouTube)”).6  Accordingly, the provision of the 
Partner Program Terms conferring upon YouTube complete control over decisions regarding 
advertisements need not be deemed subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in order to prevent the agreement from being illusory. 
To the extent Zombie suggests that YouTube does not in fact have complete discretion 
under the YouTube Partner Program Terms, that argument has no merit.  According to Zombie,  
 
[t]he Partner Program Policies note[] that failing to comply with 
these policies could result in disabling ads from your content, 
making the default assumption that ads are not disabled form 
content.  Further, the “Monetization Basics & Policies Pages” 
incorporated into the Partner Program Policies outline[] how ads 
will be served onto videos that are approved for the Partner 
Program, and goes as far to note that “[o]nce you turn on 
monetization, it may take some time for ads to appear,” not that ads 
may not appear at all. 
Opp‟n at 21 (emphasis in original).  This provision does not negate the sweeping force of the clear 
                                                 
6
 One could argue that the subscription revenue term also gives discretionary authority to 
YouTube that should be limited by the implied covenant.  However, Zombie made no such 
argument in its papers.  And even though Zombie did raise the argument at the hearing, the 
discretion is fairly limited in nature – i.e., allowing YouTube to determine what the “subset of 
participating content” is. 
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and explicit provision:  “YouTube is not obligated to display any advertisements alongside your 
videos.”  Nothing in the Partner Program Policies suggests that violation of the policies is the only 
reason why YouTube is not obligated to display advertisements; it is simply one reason. 
III.     CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the Court agrees with YouTube that all of Zombie‟s claims (the § 17200 
claim; the claims for breach of contract, the implied covenant, and quasi-contract; and the claim 
for tortious interference) are subject to dismissal given the explicit terms of the agreement.  
Moreover, the dismissal is with prejudice.  YouTube challenged Zombie‟s original complaint on 
the same ground, which led to Zombie filing an amended complaint.  Because Zombie‟s amended 
complaint failed to cure the deficiency, and because the terms of the agreement are clear, any 
further amendment to the complaint would be futile. 
For the foregoing reasons, YouTube‟s motion to dismiss is granted.  The dismissal is with 
prejudice.  Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this 
opinion and close the file in this case. 
This order disposes of Docket No. 29. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated: March 7, 2018 
______________________________________ 
EDWARD M. CHEN 
United States District Judge 
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